PLATO'S THEORY OF FORMS

An essay by Ian Bruce 1998, in answer to the following essay topic:

‘Explain in your own words Plato's Theory of Forms and then assess the strengths and weaknesses of the theory.‘

Introduction.
General Statement.
A Working Cosmology.
Strengths and Weaknesses.
Appendix 1
Appendix 2

 

Introduction.

Plato expounded his Theory of Forms over a writing career of some forty years. The theory was being refined over this period and is never fully explained in any one dialogue. Thus, any explanation of the theory involves piecing together fragments as they appear throughout Plato's writings and recasting the earlier statements in the light of the metaphysical framework developed in the later works.^{App. 1} Where possible in the current essay, statements of Plato's ideas are linked to sections of the actual dialogues I have put up as html documents, which will open in a new window when the superscript tag is clicked.

General Statement of the Theory of Forms.

The theory basically postulates the existence of a level of reality or ‘world’ inhabited by the ideal or archetypal forms of all things and concepts. Thus a form exists for objects like tables and rocks and for concepts such as beauty and justice. In the dialogue Meno, Plato describes a form as the ‘common character’ possessed by a group of things or concepts. Speaking of virtue he says:

‘Socrates: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye fixed: Do you understand? ^Meno1

The forms are eternal and changeless but enter into a partnership with changeable matter to produce the objects and examples of concepts we perceive in the temporal world.^Phaedrus1 These are always in a state of becoming and may participate in a succession of forms. Because the temporal world is always changing our perception of it is illusory and can give rise only to opinion. Plato likens the opinions derived from our senses to the perception of shadows cast by models of the real objects, as they are paraded before a fire, onto the walls of a cave. ^Republic1 True knowledge however, is the perception of the archetypal forms themselves which are real, eternal and unchanging, and exist in an eternal world beyond the limits of the cave.

Whilst the forms are invisible to the eye^*Phaedo, our souls have participated in the eternal world of forms prior to being incarnate in a physical body and retain a memory of them.^*Meno2 Although this memory is not readily accessible to the conscious mind its presence is sufficient to enable our limited perceptions. Plato maintains however, that the philosopher can achieve a state of perceiving the forms directly with his mind's eye by developing skill in discerning the abstract qualities common to groups of things and ideas in the temporal world, by realising these are merely hypotheses, and by employing the method of dialectic to categorise and group the qualities in their correct relationships and order, using these hypotheses as stepping stones to further hypotheses. Thus reason is able to construct a hierarchy of forms to scale to the height of first principle and attain a state of true knowledge.^*Republic3

All learining Plato maintains is but recollection of what our soul already knows. In the dialogue Meno, Plato agrees that enquiry is impossible because unless we already knew something we would not recognise the subject about which we wished to enquire. But counters that enquiry is worthwhile in that it can uncover our inate memory. ^*Meno3

The Theory of Forms as Part of a Working Cosmology.

In his later works Plato constructed a cosmology that could explain how an infinite, changeless God could create a temporal, ever-changing world of sense and how an immortal soul could participate in a mortal human existence.^*Timaeus1 The Theory of Forms was a primary functional component in this cosmology.

Firstly, God or the universal nature, exists outside of time and is eternal: Plato held ‘is‘ to be the only term applicable to God; ‘was’ and ‘will be’ being terms applicable only within the temporal world of God's creation.^*Timaeus2

Secondly, all objects of the temporal world are in a constant state of becoming which is a process of fashioning in the likeness of archetypal patterns (or forms) from the substance of a totally formless matter.^*Timaeus3 The world of forms is thus a principle of functionality existing on a level outside of time, part of a divine trinity of forces that is constantly giving rise to temporal existence. Thus the forms exist both outside of time and as the patterns upon which all things of the temporal world are modelled.

An Assessment of the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Theory.

In assessing the Theory of Forms it is important to remember that Plato was a profound language theorist. In the dialogue Cratylus he states that the Gods call things by their correct names but the names given by men are not always correct.^*Cratyius1 As there is meant to be a form corresponding to every name or concept used by man the notion of correct or incorrect names becomes extremely relevant. He notes that an important aspect of the dialectician's art is the giving of names.^*Cratyius2 Although, as he notes in The Republic, the names or categories derived by dialectic are merely hypotheses which the reason can use as ‘steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses‘.^*Republic3 Thus the use of words in the dialogues can be easily misinterpreted.

Socrates is usually depicted as understanding the topic under discussion and exposing the ignorance of his companions. For instance in Meno when trying to arrive at a definition of ‘virtue’ the style suggests that Socrates ‘knows’ what the common nature of virtue is. However, he explicitly states early in the dialogue that he does not know what virtue is. In fact he addresses the notion that he must have knowledge in order to ‘torpedo’ the ideas of others. He says: ‘I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself.’^*Meno4

The great logical strength of the Theory of Forms is that it is a construction capable of adapting to all criticism: whilst there are archetypal forms that correspond to all terms used by man, many of the terms used by man are incorrect; only the Gods use correct names consistently. Whilst Socrates may be presented as agreeing with his interlocutors, this is usually a step in demonstrating their state of ignorance, and indeed that of Socrates. For in the true Socratic tradition the recognition of one's own ignorance is seen as an advancement of knowledge. What is more, if a discussion results in confusion and seeming contradiction then that too can be seen as the theory at work, for Plato develops in Philebus and Phaedo the notion that because the world of the senses, the ‘seen’ world, is compounded, finite and ever-changing, the archetypal forms (the ‘unseen’) remain unchanged though their physical vehicles appear to do so ^*Phaedo.

It is important to realise that the Theory of Forms is an hypothesis that is proven by the process of inference to the best explanation. It is a grand image that identifies levels of reality, and metaphysical functionalities that Plato reasoned must exist to make any sense of the world. The actual mechanical processes involved are only defined in a very abstract manner but even here, the theory has a counter, in that man does not know the nature of the Gods.^*Cratylus3

The facts that the theory is expounded over such a vast expanse in the text of the thirty-two dialogues and that Plato often allows himself to develop an image or allegory to a point of apparent contradiction, have made it easy for later thinkers to construct criticisims based on a few words taken in isolation. Aristotle for instance, whose mind was unable to accept the notion of an infinite, timeless reality existing outside of and concurrently within finite temporal reality, developed his ‘third man‘ critique from the discussion of ‘greatness’ in the dialogue ‘Parmenides’.^*Parm.1 Such a criticism completely ignores the strong element of dramatic development inherent in Plato's style of presenting ideas.

The discussion of ‘greatness’ is the culmination of a sequence of grand images on the notion of the infinite and indivisible being able to participate in the multitude without being divided or diminished. Plato had already resolved the question with his image of ‘day’:

‘Parmenides. Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet, being one, is in each one of the many?
Socrates. Why not, Parmenides?
Parm. Because one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals and will therefore be in a state of separation from itself.
Soc. Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one; and the same in all at the same time.‘^*Parm.2

But he allows himself to come to apparent contradiction when Parmenides proposes the images of the sail^*Parm.3 and ‘the third man’.^*Parm.4 Plato is obviously more concerned with stimulating discussion and enquiry than appearing to have the answer to every question: he admits his own ignorance. He does however, answer these criticisms in later dialogues with the hierarchy of forms^*Soph.1 and the notion that the dialectician's categories or ‘words’ are merely hypotheses that can be used as stepping stones by the reason.^*Rep.3

Because the Theory of Forms is an inference to the best explanation, its true strength or soundness must be guaged by its continued use over time. The abstract nature of its definition makes it compatible with many systems of thought: some derived from Plato, others developed independently; some arising after Plato's time, others predating him. If we ask the question of why in the two thousand years of suppression of ideas and burning of books that has been the Christian era, Plato's dialogues have survived intact, we must answer that Plato's theories are fundamentally supportive of basic Christian doctrine.

The notion of God existing both outside of time and concurrently ever-present in the temporal world is perhaps most obvious. But the world of forms that contains every future possibility attainable by the changing world of sense, is in harmony with the notion of predestination^*Definition. Whilst the one, indivisible being, physically present in the many, yet not separated from itself, is essential to the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation.^*Definition The unknowable nature of God is essential Taoism,^*Tao. whilst even in the 20th century the psychoanalyst Carl Jung acknowledges the Theory of Forms as being akin to his notion of the collective unconscious.^*Jung1

Whilst the details of the mechanics are scanty, Plato's notion that the power to abstract and perceive the commonalities in apparent opposites is our ‘stepping stone’ to true knowledge, is a theme we can discern in all the great systems of human thought.

Finally, the notion of ‘the reason’ is crucial in understanding Plato. Aristotle may have liked to equate ‘the reason’ with the intellect. Such an interpretation is central to the modern notion of ‘scientism’. (Note also Aristotle's inability to accept the notion of the infinite existing both outside of time and simultaneously in all temporal creation is at the heart of modern ‘physicalism’.) Yet Plato makes it clear that the reason is a higher, vaster faculty than intellect. Certainly he maintains the training of the intellect is an essential pursuit if an individual is to gain access to his reason, but so to is gymnastics and music. The fact that so much of Plato's writing is concerned with imagery and allegory, points to the creative imagination as also being a pathway to the higher reason. The Theory of Forms is itself an hypothesis. The intellect and logic may follow after the image and devise explanations, but the hypothesis is firstly a creation of the imagination, ‘the logician can provide no rules for the formulation of an hypothesis‘^*werk1.

Thus the great strengths of the Theory of Forms are the notions of levels of reality and human faculties it identifies as existing, or needing to exist if life is to be intelligible. Its weaknesses spring from and illustrate the inadequacies of human words and concepts to approach a description of the infinite or timeless. The theory still stands as a beacon after two and a half thousand years, attesting to the vast sweep of mind Plato was able to attain, using the simple means he found in himself and the strength he found by the acknowledgement of his own weakness.

 

 

Appendix 1

The Order of Composition of the Dialogues of Plato.
The following text and list of works has been taken from an article entitled ‘Plato‘ in the 15^th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1982. The only author details given for the article is that it is written by the editors.

Order of composition. Plato's literary career extended over the greater part of a long life. The Apology must have been written early, while the memory of Socrates' trial was still fresh. The Laws, on the other hand, was the work of an old man, and the state of its text bears out the tradition that Plato never lived to give it its final revision. Since there is no evidence that Plato began his career with a fully developed ‘system‘ that had only to be exposed, and since there is every logical reason to believe that his mind developed, the order in which the various dialogues were written takes on importance. Only through it can the development of Plato's thought be adequately charted. Plato himself has given a few clues to the order: he linked the Sophist and the Statesman with the Theaetetus externally as continuations of the conversation reported in that dialogue. Similarly, he seems to have linked the Timaeus with The Republic. Aristotle noted that the Laws was written after The. Republic.

Modern scholars, by the use of stylistic criteria, have established that the Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Timaeus (with its fragmentary sequel Critias), and Laws form a distinct linguistic group, belonging to the later years of Plato's life. The whole group must be later than the Sophist, which professes to be a sequel to the Theaetetus, which, in turn, can be dated with some accuracy, since it commemorates the death of the eminent mathematician after whom it is named (probably in 369 BC). The dialogue may thus be ascribed to 368BC, the eve of Plato's departure for Syracuse. The earlier group is generally believed to have ended with the Theaetetus and the closely related Parmenides. Besides this conclusion, perhaps all that can be said with certainty is that the great outstanding dialogues, Symposium, Phaedo, and The Republic (and perhaps also Protagoras), in which Plato's dramatic power was at its highest, mark the culmination of this first period of literary activity. The comparative decline of dramatic power, accompanied by a compensating maturity of critical acumen, is the most striking contrast between the dialogues of the second period and those of the first period.

Date	Title		Date	Title
360BC	The Sophist			Euthydemos
	The Statesman			Cratylus
	Philebus			Protagoras
	Timaeus		399BC	The Apology
	Critias			Hippias Elasson
	Laws			Laches
368BC	Theaetetus			Charmides
	Phaedrus			Ion
370BC	Parmenides			Euthyphron
384BC	Symposium			Kriton
	Phaedo			Gorgias
	The Republic			Meno
386BC	Menexenos			Lysis

 

 

Appendix 2

***

Tao Te Ching of Lao Tzu, Translated by James Legge 1891.
Part 1: Chapter 1.

The Tao that can be trodden
is not the enduring and unchanging Tao.
The name that can be named
is not the enduring and unchanging name.

(Conceived of as) having no name,
it is the Originator of heaven and earth;
(conceived of as) having a name,
it is the Mother of all things.

Always without desire we must be found,
If its deep mystery we would sound;
But if desire always within us be,
Its outer fringe is all that we shall see.

Under these two aspects, it is really the same;
but as development takes place, it receives the different names.
Together we call them the Mystery.
Where the Mystery is the deepest
is the gate of all that
is subtle and wonderful.

 

Carl Jung, 'Archetypes of the Collective Consciousness', The Basic Writings of C. G. Jung, translated by R.F.C. Hull, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA, 1990.

Paragraph 67, page 328.
It always seems to us as if meaning—compared with life—were the younger event, because we assume, with some justification, that we assign it of ourselves, and because we believe, equally rightly no doubt, that the great world can get along without being interpreted. But how do we assign meaning? From what source, in the last analysis, do we derive meaning? The forms we use for assigning meaning are historical categories that reach back into the mists of time—a fact we do not take sufficiently into account. Interpretations make use of certain linguistic matrices that are themselves derived from primordial images. From whatever side we approach this question, everwhere we find ourselves confronted with the history of language, images and motifs that lead straight back to the primitive wonder-world. Take, for instance, the word ‘idea.‘ It goes back to the ‘eidos‘ concept of Plato, and the eternal ideas are primordial images stored up in a supracelestial place as eternal, transcendent forms. The eye of the seer perceives them as ‘images et larges,‘ or as images in dreams and revelatory visions. Or let us take the concept of energy, which is an interpretation of physical events. In earlier times it was the secret fire of the alchemists, or phlogiston, or the heat-force inherent in matter, like the ‘primal warmth‘ of the Stoics, or the Heraclitean ever-living fire, which borders on the primive notion of an all-pervading vital force, a power of growth and magic healing that is generally called mana. I will not go on needlessly giving examples. It is sufficient to know that there is not a single important idea or view that does not possess historical antecedents. Ultimately they are all founded on primordial archetypal forms whose concreteness dates from, a time when consciousness did not think, but only perceived. ‘Thoughts‘ were objects of inner perception, not thought at all, but sensed as external phenomena—seen or heard, so to speak. Thought was essentially revelation, not invented but forced upon us or bringing conviction through its immediacy and actuality. Thinking of this kind precedes the primive ego-consciousness, and the latter is more its object than its subject. But we ourselves have not yet climbed the last peak of consciousness, so we also have a pre-existent thinking, of which we are not aware so long as we are supported by traditional symbols—or, to put it in the language of dreams, so long as the father or the king is not dead.

 

 

Footnotes

Werkmeister, William H., 'Scientific Method', Colliers Encyclopaedia, 1980.